The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications

Allard Faculty Publications

2009

Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Towards a
Strict Utility Requirement
Graham Reynolds
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, reynolds@allard.ubc.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Law Commons

Citation Details
Graham Reynolds, "Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Towards a Strict Utility
Requirement" (2009) 6:1 U Ottawa L & Tech J 79.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard
Research Commons.

(2009) 6:1&2 UOLTJ 79

Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons  

79

Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Towards a Strict Utility Requirement
Graham Reynolds*
Nanotechnology has been described as a transformative technology that will bring about
the next industrial revolution. Over the last few decades, scientists and their research partners have acquired
nanotechnology patents in a manner resembling a gold rush. The nanotechnology gold rush has specifically
targeted nanomaterials, nanotechnology’s building blocks. Many of the patents that have been granted for
nanomaterials are broad, general patents encompassing basic research. A driving force behind the patenting
of basic research in nanotechnology was the development-oriented approach to patent rights. This approach
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, and supported the widespread patenting of basic research in the 1980s
and 1990s. Development-oriented theorists argued that the most efficient way to achieve the development
and commercialization of research is to grant broad patents on research prospects shortly after their
discovery. Beginning in 1998 with the publication of Michael A. Heller’s “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,”
the beliefs held by development-oriented theorists have been challenged by proponents of “anticommons
theory.” In particular, anticommons theorists questioned whether granting broad patents on research
prospects necessarily leads to the efficient development of research. Anticommons theorists argued that this
assumption fails to take into account the possibility that granting patents on research prospects could stifle
development through the phenomenon of the tragedy of the anticommons. This article will examine the
contemporary nanotechnology patent landscape in the United States of America to determine whether the
broad patenting of nanomaterials has led to the creation of an anticommons. It will also examine whether
this anticommons is likely to turn tragic, stifling innovation in nanotechnology. This article proposes the
adoption of a strict utility requirement as a solution to the problems posed by the tragedy of the
anticommons in nanotechnology in the US.

La nanotechnologie a été qualifiée de technologie transformative apte à provoquer la
prochaine révolution industrielle. Au cours des dernières décennies, les scientifiques et leurs partenaires de
recherche ont acquis des brevets de nanotechnologie et ce, d’une manière qui s’apparente fort à une ruée
vers l’or. La ruée vers l’or de la nanotechnologie a ciblé en particulier des nanomatériaux, qui sont les
véritables composantes de la nanotechnologie. Bon nombre des brevets accordés à l’égard de nanomatériaux
sont de vaste portée. Rappelons que les brevets de nature générale comprennent de la recherche
fondamentale. La force motrice qui sous-tend le brevetage de la recherche fondamentale de la
nanotechnologie a été l’approche axée sur le développement envers les droits attachés au brevet. Cette
approche a vu le jour dans les années 1960 et 1970, et fut à la base de la vague de brevetage de la recherche
fondamentale dans les années 1980 et 1990. Selon les théoriciens axés sur le développement, la manière la
plus efficace d’assurer le développement et la commercialisation de la recherche consiste à accorder des
brevets d’application générale sur des projets de recherche peu après leur découverte. Au début de 1998,
avec la publication de « The Tragedy of the Anticommons » de Michael A. Heller, les croyances théoriciens
axés sur le développement ont été remises en question par les adeptes de la « théorie des anticommuns ».
Les théoriciens partisans des anticommuns se sont en particulier demandé dans quelle mesure l’octroi de
brevets de portée générale à l’égard de perspectives de recherche mène forcément à un développement
concret de la recherche. Selon les théoriciens partisans des anticommuns, cette hypothèse ne tient pas
compte de la possibilité que l’octroi de brevets sur des perspectives de recherche puisse réprimer le
développement en raison du phénomène de la tragédie des anticommuns. Dans cet article, on examine le
paysage actuel du brevetage de la nanotechnologie aux États-Unis afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure le
brevetage général des nanomatériaux aurait entraîné la création d’un anticommun. On se demande
également si cet anticommun pourrait entraîner une innovation étouffante et tragique en matière de
nanotechnologie. Selon cet article, l’adoption d’une exigence de stricte utilité permettrait de résoudre les
problèmes posés par la tragédie des anticommuns en matière de nanotechnologie aux États-Unis.
Copyright 2009 © by Graham Reynolds
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Nanotechnology and the Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Towards a Strict Utility Requirement

Graham Reynolds

1. INTRODUCTION
E ncompassing “ nearly every discipline of science and engineering,”1

nanotechnology has been described as a transformative technology that will
bring about   “the next industrial revolution.”2 Nanotechnology is broadly
characterized as the construction and application of materials and structures at
the nanometer scale (1 nanometer = 1 billionth of a meter), where properties of
matter differ significantly from those at a larger scale.3 Nanotechnology is
projected to have a global market value of USA$1 trillion by 2010.4 In addition
to being lucrative, some believe that nanotechnology can help solve many of the
problems facing the world today. Nanotechnology has been said to have the
ability to repair damage caused to the environment, create new and virtually
boundless fresh water resources, and cure various diseases, among other
astonishing possibilities.5
Over the last few decades, scientists and their research partners have

��
2.

3.
4.
5.

Massimiliano di Ventra, Stephane Evoy and James R Heflin Jr., eds, Introduction to Nanoscale Science and
Technology (Kluwer,  2004)  at p. 1.
Liming Dal, “From Conventional Technology to Carbon Nanotechnology: The Fourth Industrial Revolution
and the Discoveries of C60, Carbon Nanotube and Nanodiamond,” in Liming Dal, ed., Carbon
Nanotechnology (Elsevier, 2006) at p. 3; Joachim Schummer and Davis Baird, eds., Nanotechnology
Challenges: Implications for Philosophy, Ethics and Society (World Scientific,  2006) at p. 1; J Storrs Hall,
Nanofuture: What’s Next for Nanotechnology (Prometheus Books, 2005) at p. 9.
Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, “Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities
and Uncertainties,” (July 2004), <http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm> at p. 5.	
RNCOS, The World Nanotechnology Market (October 2005), <http://www.researchandmarkets.com/
reportinfo.asp?report_id=307510>.
UNCTAD, “Interactive Dialogue on Harnessing Emerging Technologies to Meet the Millennium
Development Goals,” (14 June 2004), <http://stdev.unctad.org/unsystem/emerging.htm>, cited in Donald
C MacLurcan, “Nanotechnology and Developing Countries, Part 1: What Possibilities?” AZojono Journal of
Nanotechnology Online (2004), <http://www.azonano.com/Details.asp?ArticleID=1428>; Fabio SalamancaBuentello, Deepa L Persad, Erin B Court, Douglas K Martin, Abdallah S Daar and Peter A Singer,
“Nanotechnology and the Developing World,” (2005) 2:5 PLOS Medicine e97, <http://medicine.
plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020097>. 
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acquired nanotechnology patents6 in a manner resembling a “gold rush.”7  The
nanotechnology gold rush has specifically targeted nanomaterials.8 Referred to as
nanotechnology’s “building blocks,” nanomaterials are the foundation of future
development in nanotechnology.9 Many of the patents that have been granted
for nanomaterials are broad, general patents that encompass basic research.
Nanotechnology is the first modern technology to have its basic research
patented.10 The basic research of most other twentieth-century technologies,
including the computer, software, the internet, and biotechnology, has generally
remained in the public domain.11 A driving force behind the patenting of basic
research in nanotechnology was the development-oriented approach to patent
rights, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. The most prominent account of the
development-oriented approach is Edmund Kitch’s “prospect theory.”12 Inspired
by the principle of the tragedy of the commons13 and based on the hypothetical
Coasean world with zero transaction costs,14 Kitch argued that the most efficient
way to achieve the development and commercialization of research is to grant
broad patents on research prospects shortly after their discovery.15
Development-oriented arguments supported the widespread patenting
of basic research in the 1980s and 1990s.16 First, development-oriented arguments
played a role in the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, a technology transfer
statute that encouraged scientists to patent the results of federally funded research.17
Scientists responded to the incentives provided by the Bayh-Dole Act by increasing
their efforts to seek patents.18 Second, development-oriented arguments played a
role in the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982,
a unified court of patent appeals. Decisions of the CAFC weakening various patent
requirements led to increased patenting of basic research.19
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

A patent can be defined as a public document that gives the patentee exclusive rights to the use of the
invention as defined in the patent claims.
Lux Research, Inc., “Nanotechnology Gold Rush Yields Crowded, Entangled Patents” (21 April 2005),
<http://www.luxresearchinc.com/press/RELEASE_IPreport.pdf>. 
Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7.
Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7; Nicholas A Kotov, ed, Nanoparticle Assemblies
and Superstructures (Taylor & Francis, 2006) at preface; Ventra, Evoy and Heflin Jr., Introduction to
Nanoscale Science and Technology, supra note 1 at p. 2; John C Miller, Ruben Serrato, Jose Miguel
Represas-Cardenas, Griffith Kundahl, The Handbook of Nanotechnology: Business, Policy and Intellectual
Property Law (Wiley, 2005) at p. 15.
Mark A Lemley, “Patenting Nanotechnology,” (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review 601–630, <http://lawreview.
stanford.edu/content/vol58/issue2/lemley.pdf > at pp. 601, 605. 
Lemley, “Patenting Nanotechnology,”supra note 10 at p. 613. Nanotechnology is the first technology to
have its basic ideas and building blocks patented since the airplane industry and radio industry
experienced “debilitating patent battles” in the early twentieth century.  Lemley, “Patenting
Nanotechnology,”supra note 10 at pp. 605–606.
Arti Kaur Rai, “Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science,” (1999)
94:1 Northwestern University Law Review 77–152, <http://eprints.law.duke.edu/451/1/94_Nw._U._L._
Rev._77_(1999-2000).pdf> at pp. 77, 120; Edmund W Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent
System,” (1977) 20 The Journal of Law & Economics 265–290,   at p. 265.
Dan L Burk and Mark A Lemley, “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 1575–1696,
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=431360> at pp. 1575–1600.
Burk and Lemley, “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” supra note 13 at p. 1600.
Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent System,” supra note 12 at p. 266.
Rai, “Regulating Scientific Research,” supra note 12.
Bayh-Dole Act, (1980) 35 United States Code, ch 18, ss. 200–212, <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/35/
usc_sup_01_35_10_II_20_18.html>.
Rai, “Regulating Scientific Research,” supra note 12 at p. 109.
Rai, “Regulating Scientific Research,” supra note 12 at p. 120.  For instance, the CAFC weakened the utility
requirement in In re Brana (USA Fed Cir, 1995), <http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/51/51.
F3d.1560.93-1393.html>, 63 United States Law Week 2656. In the same year, it weakened the
nonobviousness standard in In re Deuel (USA Fed Cir, 1995) 51 Federal Reporter, 3d Ser. 1552.
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In recent years, the beliefs held by development-oriented theorists
have been challenged by proponents of “anticommons theory.”20 In particular,
anticommons theorists questioned whether granting broad patents on research
prospects necessarily leads to the efficient development and commercialization
of research.21 Anticommons theorists argued that this assumption fails to take into
account the possibility that granting broad patents on research prospects could
stifle development through the phenomenon of the tragedy of the anticommons.
The seminal account of “anticommons theory” is Michael A Heller’s “The
Tragedy of the Anticommons.”22 Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg are the two most
prominent anticommons theorists. They state that anticommons property can
be seen as the “mirror image” of commons property.23 In commons property,
multiple individuals have privileges of use in a scarce resource, and no one can
exclude another.24 As a result, the resource is prone to overexploitation.25 This
overexploitation is described as the “tragedy of the commons.” The tragedy of
the commons is resolved by granting rights of exclusion in the scarce resource.
Conversely, anticommons property is created where too many individuals are
endowed with rights of exclusion in a scarce resource.26 In this situation, no
one has a privilege of use.27 The “tragedy” of the anticommons occurs where
individuals are unable to bundle the exclusionary rights in the scarce resource,
causing the resource to be underused.
Kitch advocated for the broad patenting of research prospects as a
response to what he viewed as the tragedy of the commons in scientific research.
This article will examine whether, in the context of nanotechnology, the attempt
to overcome one tragedy has led to the creation of another. An analysis of the
US nanotechnology patent landscape suggests that an anticommons has been
created in nanomaterials. Patent rights in nanomaterials are broad, overlapping,
and fragmented.28 Before one can use a nanomaterial, one must first acquire
licenses for all of the fragmented and overlapping nanomaterial patents. A
“tragedy” of the anticommons will occur if individuals are unable to bundle the
patent rights. If the nanotechnology anticommons turns tragic, nanomaterials will
be underutilized and nanotechnology innovation will suffer.
The nanotechnology anticommons will not necessarily become tragic. The
tragedy of the anticommons will be prevented if the fragmented and overlapping
patent rights in nanomaterials can be assembled into useful bundles. There are
two main ways to bundle the multiple exclusionary rights in nanomaterials. The first
occurs through informal market mechanisms, such as cross-licensing agreements
or patent pools. The success of informal market mechanisms depends on the
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Michael A Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,”
(1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621–688, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=57627>
at p. 621; Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research” (1 May 1998) 280 Science 698–701, <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/
reprint/280/5364/698.pdf> at p. 698.
Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20; Heller and Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter
Innovation?” supra note 20.
Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20.
Heller and Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation?” supra note 20 at p. 698.  
Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 624.
Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 624.
Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 624.
Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 624.
Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7.
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ability of the parties involved to licence their patents effectively. Developmentoriented theory is premised on the Coasean assumption of zero transaction
costs.29 In the case of nanotechnology, however, transaction costs and strategic
behaviour will likely prove to be substantial impediments to the achievement of
informal licensing agreements.
The second way to assemble the fragmented and overlapping patent
rights in nanomaterials into useful bundles is through non-market action, namely
through legislative or judicial redefinition of rights. This article proposes the
adoption of a strict utility requirement as a solution to the problems posed by
the tragedy of the anticommons in nanotechnology. The utility requirement is an
essential element of patentability. It stipulates that inventions cannot be patented
unless they are “useful.” In the US, the utility requirement, in the context of
scientific research, has fluctuated between a weak and a strict standard.
The adoption of a strict utility requirement is particularly suited as a
solution to the tragedy of the anticommons in nanotechnology. Many of the
patents making up the nanotechnology anticommons encompass basic research
and were granted on the basis of a weak utility requirement. Most of these claims
would not satisfy a strict utility requirement. As a result, the adoption of a strict
utility requirement would invalidate a substantial number of broad, overlapping
patents on nanomaterials.
This solution will not eradicate the anticommons. It is likely that many
patents would be able to satisfy the strict utility standard while still having sufficient
breadth to be considered part of the nanotechnology anticommons. The removal
of multiple exclusionary rights from the nanotechnology anticommons, however,
makes it more likely that users will be able to bundle the remaining nanomaterial
patents through informal licensing agreements. Thus, the nanotechnology
anticommons is less likely to turn tragic.
My analysis is divided into seven parts. Part 2 will introduce
nanotechnology and nanomaterials. Part 3 will discuss the patenting of basic
scientific research in the US. It will introduce the development-oriented approach
and discuss its influence on US patent law. Part 4 will introduce anticommons
theory. It will also explain why it is appropriate to critique the developmentoriented approach using anticommons theory. Part 5 will suggest the existence of
an anticommons in nanomaterials in the US. Part 6 will explore market solutions to
the nanotechnology anticommons. It will discuss why informal market mechanisms
will likely fail to overcome the nanotechnology anticommons. Part 7 will explore
various non-market solutions to the problems posed by the US nanotechnology
anticommons. I propose the adoption of a strict utility requirement as a solution
to the problems posed by the tragedy of the anticommons in nanotechnology.
This article will address the nanotechnology anticommons in the
US. The US leads the world in both government and corporate spending in
nanotechnology, in publications on nanoscale science and engineering topics,
and in nanotechnology patents.30 The race to patent nanotechnology inventions
is occurring worldwide. As a result, nanotechnology anticommons may have
29.
30.

Burk and Lemley, “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” supra note 13 at p. 1600.
Lux Research Inc., “Top Nations in Nanotech See Their Lead Erode,” (8 March 2007),
<http://www.luxresearchinc.com/press/RELEASE_NationsRanking2007.pdf>.
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developed in countries other than the US. However, given the position of the US
as the world’s leader in nanotechnology, the elimination of the nanotechnology
anticommons in the US will go a long way towards ensuring that, globally,
nanotechnology’s potential will not be stifled due to excessive transaction and
strategic costs.

*
2. OVERVIEW OF NANOTECHNOLOGY
T his part will first define nanotechnology and nanomaterials. Second, it

will describe the historical development of nanotechnology. Third, it will
comment on nanotechnology’s potential. Fourth, it will describe how a significant
number of the patents that have been granted for nanomaterials encompass
basic scientific research.
2.1. Definitions
2.1.1. Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology is broadly characterized as the construction and application
of materials and structures at the nanometer scale, where properties of matter
differ significantly from those at a larger scale.31 The field of nanotechnology
is defined primarily by a unit of length, the nanometer.32 One nanometer,
which spans approximately 10 atoms,33 is equivalent to one billionth of a meter
�9
(1 nm = 1x10 m).34 To put this size in context, a human hair has a thickness
of approximately 80,000 nanometers, a DNA molecule is approximately 2.5
nanometers wide, and the diameter of a red blood cell is approximately 5,000
nanometers.35
Two aspects of working at the nanometer scale afford the main drive for
investment in nanotechnology.36   First, progressing from the micrometer scale
to the nanometer scale allows one to pursue the “miniaturization of current and
new instruments, sensors and machines.”37 This miniaturization permits “more
functionality in a given space.”38 Furthermore, manufacturing advantages can flow
from “increases in a material’s surface area and surface-to-volume ratio.”39 These
increases are inherent in any progression from the micrometer to nanometer scale.40
Second, while materials at the micrometer scale generally exhibit the same
physical properties as materials in macro form, materials at the nanometer scale
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, “Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies,” supra note 3
at p. 5.
Ventra, Evoy, and Heflin Jr., Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology, supra note 1 at p. 1.
Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 13.
Ventra, Evoy and Heflin Jr., Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology, supra note 1 at p. 1.
ETC Group, “A Tiny Primer on Nano-Scale Technologies and ‘The Little Bang Theory,’” (June 2005) 1–20,
<http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/55/01/tinyprimer_english.pdf> at p. 1.
Roy Shenhar, Tyler B Norsten and Vincent M Rotello, “Self-Assembly and Self-Organization” in Ventra, Evoy
and Heflin Jr., Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology, supra note 1at p. 41.
Guozhong Cao, Nanostructures & Nanomaterials: Synthesis, Properties & Applications (Imperial College
Press, 2004) at p. v.
Cao, Nanostructure & Nanomaterials, supra note 37 at p. v.
MacLurcan, “Nanotechnology and Developing Countries,” supra note 5 at p. 2.
MacLurcan, “Nanotechnology and Developing Countries,” supra note 5 at p. 2. 

86

university of ottawa law & technology journal

www.uoltj.ca

may exhibit physical properties that are dramatically different than those in macro
form.41 This discrepancy is due to the fact that when dealing with matter smaller
than approximately 50 nanometers, “the laws of quantum physics supersede those
of traditional physics.”42 As a result, shrinking matter to the level of the nanometer
scale can cause it to exhibit properties that it does not exhibit at the micro or
macro scales, such as “electrical conductivity, elasticity, greater strength, different
colour, [tolerance to temperature and pressure,43] and greater reactivity.”44 For
instance, macro scale carbon is soft and malleable.45 At the nano-scale, “carbon
can be stronger than steel and is six times lighter.”46 Zinc oxide, “usually white and
opaque,” becomes transparent at the nanoscale.47 Aluminum can “spontaneously
combust at the nano-scale,” a property which it does not possess at the macro
scale.48 Nano-particles of silver have some ability to combat microbes, an ability
that large particles do not display.49 The discovery of these new physical properties
can lead to technological advancement across all industrial sectors.50
2.1.2. Nanomaterials

Nanomaterials are arrangements of matter that exhibit unique characteristics
and properties as a result of their size (approximately 1 to 100 nanometers in
length).51 They are nanotechnology’s “building blocks,” the foundation of future
development in nanotechnology.52 John C Miller notes that the analogy of building
a house is appropriate to understanding nanomaterials and nanotechnology:
Houses can be comprised of a variety of materials: wood, nails, sheet rock, bricks,
and so on. Just as a builder puts together different shapes and pieces of these
materials to construct a home, nanotechnologists experiment with a variety of
different nanomaterials to build complex materials, devices and systems.53

The key nanomaterials in existence today are fullerenes, carbon nanotubes,
nanowires, semiconductor crystals (also referred to as quantum dots), and
dendrimers.54 Nanomaterials can be combined to form various structures,
devices, and systems.55 The present challenge in nanotechnology is to shift from
the production of nanomaterials to “organizing them in one-, two-, and threedimensional structures.”56
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Cao, Nanostructures & Nanomaterials, supra note 37 at p. 6.
MacLurcan, “Nanotechnology and Developing Countries,” supra note 5 at p. 2.
MacLurcan, “Nanotechnology and Developing Countries,” supra note 5 at p. 2.
ETC Group, “A Tiny Primer on Nano Scale Technologies,” supra note 35 at p. 1.
ETC Group, “A Tiny Primer on Nano Scale Technologies,” supra note 35 at p. 2.
ETC Group, “A Tiny Primer on Nano Scale Technologies,” supra note 35 at p. 2.
ETC Group, “A Tiny Primer on Nano Scale Technologies,” supra note 35 at p. 2.
ETC Group, “A Tiny Primer on Nano Scale Technologies,” supra note 35 at p. 2.
Jeffrey H Matsuura, Nanotechnology Regulation and Policy Worldwide (Artech House, 2006) at p. 10.
Cao, Nanostructure & Nanomaterials, supra note 37 at p. v; MacLurcan, “Nanotechnology and Developing
Countries,” supra note 5 at p. 2.
Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 13.
Kotov, Nanoparticle Assemblies and Superstructures, supra note 9 at preface; Ventra, Evoy and Heflin Jr.,
Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology, supra note 1 at p. 2; Miller et al., The Handbook of
Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 15.
Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 15. 
Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7; Ventra, Evoy and Heflin Jr., Introduction to
Nanoscale Science and Technology, supra note 1 at p. 2.
Ventra, Evoy and Heflin Jr., Introduction to Nanoscale Science and Technology, supra note 1 at p. 2.
Kotov, Nanoparticle Assemblies and Superstructures, supra note 9 at preface.
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2.2. Historical Development of Nanotechnology

Nobel-prize winning physicist Richard Feynman is credited as the first
individual to engage with some of the fundamental concepts underlying
nanotechnology.57 On 29 December 1959, in a lecture entitled “There’s
Plenty of Room at the Bottom” presented at the annual meeting of the
American Physical Society at the California Institute of Technology, Feynman
discussed the possibilities of “manipulating and controlling matter” on the
atomic scale.58 Anticipating the opportunities that flow from working with
matter subject to the laws of quantum mechanics, Feynman stated that:
When we get to the very, very small world—say circuits of seven atoms—we have
a lot of new things that would happen that represent completely new
opportunities for design. Atoms on a small scale behave like nothing on a large
scale, for they satisfy the laws of quantum mechanics. So, as we go down and
fiddle around with the atoms down there, we are working with different laws, and
we can expect to do different things. We can manufacture in different ways.59

It took fifteen years from the date of Feynman’s lecture for the
term “nanotechnology” to emerge. Coined by analogy to the epithet
“microtechnology,” which is “broadly applied to any technology that manipulated
matter at the micron scale,”60 Tokyo Science University Professor Norio Taniguchi in
a 1974 paper defined the term “nanotechnology” as “the processing of, separation,
consolidation, and deformation of materials by one atom or one molecule.”61
The term “nanotechnology” was explored in greater depth in the work
of K Eric Drexler. In 1987, Drexler published a book entitled Engines of Creation:
the Coming Era of Nanotechnology.62 Some mark the publication of Engines
of Creation as the point where the “field of nanotechnology began its formal
existence.”63 In discussing nanotechnology’s potential, Drexler describes the
ability of “replicating assemblers to copy themselves by the ton, then make other
products such as computers, rocket engines, chairs, and so forth.”64 He states that
nanotechnology will enable humanity to restore damaged ecosystems, cure the
“disease” called aging, return some species from apparent extinction, and travel
through space easily and conveniently in a spacesuit that is so light it is barely
noticeable.65 As a result of challenges from the scientific community on the basis
of “technological feasibility,” Drexler later renamed his vision of nanotechnology
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“molecular manufacturing.”66 In so doing, Drexler distanced his vision from the
definition of nanotechnology as set out above.
2.3. Nanotechnology’s Potential

Projected to be a “transformative technology” like the steam engine in the
eighteenth century, electricity in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and
the internet today,67 nanotechnology has been heralded as having the potential to
bring about a new kind of industrial revolution.68 The cross-industry applicability
of nanotechnology means that its technological impact “can probably not
be compared with any other technical development up to the present time,
since it will concern all aspects of human life.”69 It has been predicted that
nanotechnology will have a positive impact on medical applications, information
technologies, energy production and storage, materials science, food, water and
environmental research, and security, among other sectors.70 A 1996 UNESCOsponsored study states that “nanotechnology will provide the foundation of all
technologies in the new century.”71
Although some point to nanotechnology’s potential to widen the divide
between the “haves” and “have-nots,”72 many believe that it can be used for the
benefit of developing countries.73 United Nations representatives have suggested
that nanotechnology can help “reduce the cost and increase the likelihood of
attaining” the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), eight goals that aim to
meet the needs of the world’s poorest by the target date of 2015.74
2.3.1. Many Patents That Have Been Granted for Nanomaterials Encompass
Basic Scientific Research

Many patents that have been granted for nanomaterials encompass basic scientific
research. These patents are broad, uncertain, vaguely defined, and remain at a
significant distance from any solution to a specific practical problem. Patenting
basic research allows patentees to control large sectors of nanotechnology.
66.
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Consequently, patents encompassing basic research are attractive to persons
seeking to establish a dominant presence in the nanotechnology industry.

*
3. THE PATENTING OF BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE US
N anotechnology is the first modern technology to have its basic research

patented.75 The basic research of most other twentieth-century technologies,
including the computer, software, internet, and biotechnology, generally
remained in the public domain.76 Historically, the US academic scientific
community had been reluctant to secure property rights in basic research.77 The
reluctance of US academic researchers to patent basic research was supported
by traditional scientific norms, government policy, the reward theory of patent
law, and judicial decisions that discouraged the patentability of basic scientific
research. This attitude of general reluctance towards patenting basic research
will be referred to as the “commons model.” During the period when the
commons model was the prevailing model of patenting, a significant proportion
of basic scientific research made its way into the public domain.  
For instance, the computer, “largely the result of military research
projects during World War II,”78 remained unpatented due both to military
secrecy and to the fact that, at that time, “government-sponsored research was
not generally patented.”79 Basic software remained unpatented during the 1960s,
1970s, and early 1980s as a result of the courts’ determination that software
was not patentable subject matter.80 The internet’s basic protocols remain in the
public domain due to the traditional attitude that inventions developed with
federal funding and at universities should not receive patent protection.81 These
traditional attitudes also led to biotechnology’s basic inventions ending up in the
public domain.82
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, a series of changes led to widespread
support for the patenting of basic scientific research.83 One contributing factor
was the emergence of the development-oriented model of patenting.84 The
development-oriented model is centered on the view that patents should be
granted early in the process of innovation so as to “induce…firms to commit
resources to the development of inventions.”85 Edmund Kitch’s “prospect theory,”
introduced in 1977 in his essay “The Nature and Function of the Patent System,”
75.
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is the seminal academic example of the development-oriented approach.86 In
this work, Kitch argues that the “reward theory” (at that time the prevailing
economic theory in patent law) offers an “incomplete picture of the functions
of the patent system.”87 He states that the patent system performs another
function, not previously noted.88 Namely, the patent system helps promote the
efficient allocation of resources among prospects, thereby increasing the output
of resources used for technological innovation.89 It does so by permitting the
granting of broad patents on prospects, shortly after their discovery.90 The
patentee is then placed in a position to monitor and coordinate the development
of the prospect through licensing.91 Kitch calls this view of the patent system
“prospect theory.”92 It has been described as “one of the most significant efforts
to integrate intellectual property with property rights theory.”93
The theoretical foundations of prospect theory are the tragedy of the
commons and the hypothetical Coasean world with zero transaction costs.94 A
tragedy of the commons occurs where multiple individuals have privileges of
use in a scarce resource, and “no one has the right to exclude another.”95 As a
result, the resource is prone to overexploitation.96 The concept of the “tragedy
of the commons” was popularized by Garrett Hardin.97 Two classic examples of
the “tragedy of the commons” are depleted fisheries and overgrazed fields.98
Heller and Eisenberg note that “[t]oday, Hardin’s metaphor is central to debates
in economics, law, and science and is a powerful justification for privatizing
commons property.”99
In his essay “The Optimal Timing of Innovation,” Yoram Barzel applies
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” principle to scientific research. He takes the
position that like common fields and fisheries, basic scientific knowledge is a free
public good.100 Barzel believes that “since the basic knowledge is costless to the
innovator, he introduces a discovery when it first becomes profitable instead of
waiting until profits are maximized.”101 He states that in this way, basic knowledge
is “overexploited comparably to public roads, fisheries, and oil and water
pools.”102 In the case of basic knowledge used by innovators, “the excessive use
86.
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of resources takes the form of their premature application.”103
The conventional solution to the tragedy of the commons is the
privatization of the commons.104 It is thought that if property owners suffer the
full cost consequence of their actions, they will not overuse the resource.105
In order to remedy the tragedy of the commons in basic scientific research,
Barzel recommends converting basic scientific research into private property.106
Specifically, Barzel proposes that, “by granting (or auctioning) monopoly rights on
potential innovations before resources are committed to the innovating activity,”
the patent system can prevent such a premature allocation of resources.107
According to Barzel, private ownership will allow the grantee of the rights
to maximize the present value of the object of ownership by undertaking (or
contracting for) “the innovation investment at that point of time which is also
socially optimal.”108
Kitch’s ideas for prospect theory “crystallized” in response to Barzel’s
essay.109 Kitch concurs with Barzel’s statement that potential innovations
(prospects) are a form of public good, comparable to fisheries, oil, or mineral
claims, that will “not be efficiently used absent exclusive ownership.”110 Each
public prospect can be pursued by multiple firms, each of which can use any
level of resources to develop the prospect.111 Firms also need not disclose their
activities to their competitors.112 This results in wastefulness as firms expend
valuable scarce resources attempting to develop the same prospect.113
Rather than adopt Barzel’s method of “granting” or “auctioning”
monopoly rights in potential innovations, however, Kitch takes the position that
the most efficient way to privatize prospects is through the patent system.114
Kitch advocates awarding patents to prospects shortly after their discovery,
“even though the practical significance of the innovation may be but dimly
perceived.”115 Kitch notes that since the patent owner has the exclusive right
to develop the patented technology, no one is likely to invest in the prospect
without first making arrangements with the patent owner.116 Otherwise, lacking a
license to the underlying prospect, they may not be able to reap the benefits of
their investment. The patent owner is thus placed in a controlling position with
respect to the prospect. She can seek out or entertain licensees, cause prospective
searchers to exchange information, and avoid duplicative investments, thereby
maximizing the resources available for innovation. Burk and Lemley note that
“this is the Coase theorem at work”:
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under that theorem, giving one party the power to control and orchestrate all
subsequent use and research relating to the patented technology should
result in efficient licensing, both to end users and to potential improvers—
assuming, that is, that information is perfect, all parties are rational, and
licensing is costless.117

Kitch argues that the “prospect function” is a “significant, if not the
predominant, function of the American patent system as it has operated
in fact.”118 He bases this statement on three features of the American patent
system.119 First, he states that the scope accorded to patent claims reaches “well
beyond what the reward function would require.”120 In support of this point, Kitch
provides various examples where the patent claim has been held to include more
than what was made or accomplished by the inventor at the time of patenting.121
Second, Kitch states that “many technologically important patents have been
issued long before commercial exploitation became possible.”122 He provides
a table of case studies to support his point. Third, Kitch notes that rules of
patentability (such as priority and time-bar) “force an early patent application
whether or not something of value (and hence a reward) has been found.”123
Development-oriented arguments were a significant factor in the
“dramatic shift” in the legal framework surrounding scientific research.124
Faced with “mounting […] evidence […] that the US [was] falling behind its
international competition in the development of new products and inventions,”
Congress decided that in order to “[rescue] the results of federally sponsored
research […] from oblivion and successfully develop [them] into commercial
products,” as Eisenberg states, the results of federally sponsored research
would have to be “patented and offered up for private appropriation.”125 As a
result, the US government, beginning in 1980, “embarked on a concerted effort
to apply property-based incentives to scientific research.”126 This concerted
effort is demonstrated in the passage of various technology transfer statutes
that encourage government agencies, educational institutions, and non-profit
institutions to apply for patents on inventions derived from federally funded
research.127 The most influential of these technology transfer statutes is the
Bayh-Dole Act.128 Passed in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act gives universities and
small businesses the right to “seek patent rights on the results of their federally
sponsored research and to retain patent ownership themselves.”129 It also
requires universities to share patent royalties with individual inventors. The stated
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policy objective of the Bayh-Dole Act is “to use the patent system to promote the
utilization of inventions from federally supported research or development.”130
The expansion of property rights in research “initially met with loud
outcries from the scientific community.”131 However, “universities and individual
researchers soon began to respond to the financial incentives of Bayh-Dole by
rejecting communalism and increasing efforts to seek patents.”132 The period
between 1980 and 2003 saw a near sixteen-fold increase in patents granted to
universities (from approximately 250 US patents per year in 1980 to 3933 patents
per year in 2003).133 The development of the public domain was further limited
by partnerships between academia and industry that restricted the options of
scientists seeking to publish their results in the public domain.134
Development-oriented arguments were also used to justify the creation,
in 1982, of the CAFC, a unified court responsible for all patent appeals.135 Rai
states that:
proponents of a single forum for patent appeals argued that the stronger
patent rights created by a more uniform interpretation of the patent law were
necessary for economic growth and international competitiveness.136

The view that the predominant function of patent rights is to promote the
efficient development and commercialization of research has been evident in
case law emerging from the CAFC.137 The CAFC weakened both the utility and
nonobviousness standards of patentability, and expanded the range of subject matter
that could be patented.138 Taken together, these theoretical and legislative changes
helped create an environment that supported the widespread patenting of basic
research. Nanotechnology is the first technology to emerge into this environment.

*
4. ANTICOMMONS THEORY
T his part will first provide an overview of anticommons theory. Second, it

will argue that it is appropriate to use anticommons theory to critique the
development-oriented approach.
4.1. Overview of Anticommons Theory

Heller and Eisenberg describe anticommons property as the mirror image
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of commons property.139 In commons property, “owners hold rights not to be
excluded” from a scarce resource.140 This situation can lead to overexploitation
of the resource, referred to by Hardin and others as a tragedy of the commons.141
Two canonical examples of the tragedy of the commons are overgrazed fields
and depleted lakes. The conventional solution to the tragedy of the commons is
the privatization of the resource.142
Privatization, however, though solving the tragedy of the commons, can
cause another tragedy, that of the anticommons.143 Heller notes that though the
tragedy of the commons metaphor reveals the cost of overuse when many people
are given rights to use a scarce resource, it “overlooks the possibility of underuse
when governments give too many people rights to exclude others.”144 The latter
situation describes an anticommons, a situation where “too many individuals have
rights of exclusion in a scarce resource.”145 The scarce resource can be utilized
only after all of these rights of exclusion have been bundled together.146
An anticommons problem can arise horizontally, vertically, or through
a patent thicket.147 An anticommons problem arises horizontally when a person
has to secure licenses to concurrent fragments of rights in order to use a single
resource.148 One example of a horizontal anticommons is described in Heller’s
“The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” namely “empty Moscow storefronts.”149
If one wishes to set up shop, one must secure the consent of all individual
rightholders, including those individuals endowed with the right to sell, receive
sale revenue, lease, receive lease revenue, occupy, and determine use. 150 If these
concurrent rights cannot be assembled, the anticommons will turn tragic and the
storefront will go underused. Another example of a horizontal anticommons can
be found in basic biomedical research, where individuals must assemble multiple
gene fragments held by different patentees in order to create a commercial
product.151 The tragedy of the anticommons arises vertically when there are
“too many upstream patent owners [stacking] licenses on top of the future
discoveries of downstream use.”152 One situation in which this tragedy occurs is
where companies attempt to integrate patents on basic scientific research with
those on downstream innovations.153 Lastly, Siva Vaidhyanathan notes that “one
acutely pernicious form of the anti-commons problem is a ‘patent thicket.’”154
The concept of a “patent thicket,” developed by economist Carl Shapiro, refers
to overlapping spheres of intellectual property rights that a company must “hack
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its way through” in order to commercialize a new product.155 Patent thickets are
considered to “discourage and stifle innovation.”156
The anticommons will not necessarily become tragic.157 If there are
no transaction costs or holdouts, “owners may keep property in anticommons
form and perfectly coordinate its use so its performance mimics that of private
property.”158 Transaction costs and strategic behaviour, however, can sometimes
prevent the assembly of the necessary rights.159 As Heller notes, “once an
anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable private property bundles can
be brutal and uneven.”160 With respect to transaction costs, it can be difficult and
expensive to determine exactly which rights are needed in order to develop the
resource.161 Furthermore, certain patent holders may decide to act strategically
as holdouts, refusing to license their patent unless they are paid a sum in excess
of the value of their patent (and in certain cases a “bribe close to the value
of the entire project”162). Burk and Lemley note that “every property holder
needed for the project is subject to this same incentive.”163 The holdout problem
is accentuated in the case of an anticommons at the level of basic research, in
which case the “value” of a resource itself is sometimes difficult to determine with
any accuracy.164 The “tragedy” of the anticommons occurs where individuals are
unable to assemble the fragmented or overlapping rights, causing the resource
to be underused.
4.2. It is Appropriate to Use Anticommons Theory to Challenge DevelopmentOriented Theorists’ Commitment to Patenting Basic Scientific Research

The theoretical foundations of the development-oriented approach are the
metaphor of the tragedy of the commons and the hypothetical Coasean world
with zero transaction costs. Anticommons theory engages with both of these
theoretical issues. As a result, it is appropriate to use anticommons theory to
challenge development-oriented theorists’ belief that patenting basic research
will necessarily lead to its efficient development and commercialization.  
Development-oriented theorists rely on the “tragedy of the commons”
principle. They argue that early patenting of scientific prospects will overcome
the “tragedy of the commons” in scientific research by eliminating “wasteful”
duplicative investment, thus promoting the efficient development and
commercialization of research. Anticommons theorists also engage with the
“tragedy of the commons” principle. They argue that in certain circumstances,
155. Carl Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting,” in Adam
Jaffe, Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds., Innovation Policy and the Economy (MIT Press, 2001) 119–150,
<http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf> at pp. 119–120; Raj Bawa, “Will the Nanomedicine
‘Patent Land Grab’ Thwart Commercialization?” (2005) 1:4 Nanomedicine: Nanotechnology, Biology, and
Medicine 346–350 at p. 348.
156. Bawa, “Will the Nanomedicine ‘Patent Land Grab’ Thwart Commercialization?” supra note 155 at p. 348;
Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket,” supra note 155 at p. 119. 
157. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 673.
158. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 673.
159. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at pp. 673–674; Burk and Lemley, “Policy Levers
in Patent Law,” supra note 13 at p. 1611.
160. Heller and Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation?” supra note 20 at p. 698; Heller, “The Tragedy of the
Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 678.
161. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 673.
162. Burk and Lemley, “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” supra note 13 at p. 1611.
163. Burk and Lemley, “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” supra note 13 at pp. 1611–1612.
164. Heller and Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation?” supra note 20 at p. 699.
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the attempt to overcome the tragedy of the commons by granting property
rights in a scarce resource can cause another tragedy, that of the anticommons.
Thus, rather than facilitating the efficient development and commercialization
of research, the attempt to remedy the tragedy of the commons by patenting
basic scientific research may, in fact, stifle innovation. Due to the connection
between the tragedy of the commons and the tragedy of the anticommons,
it is appropriate to use anticommons theory to challenge the assumption held
by development-oriented theorists that broad patenting of basic research will
necessarily lead to the efficient development and commercialization of research.
Development-oriented theorists argue that granting broad patent rights
on basic research will not be problematic, as parties will be able to license patents
efficiently. This argument is premised on the existence of the hypothetical Coasean
world with zero transaction costs.165 Anticommons theory, on the other hand,
emphasizes the transaction costs and strategic behaviours absent in the hypothetical
Coasean world. While development-oriented theorists assume that transaction
costs are non-existent, anticommons theorists call attention to the difficulties in
assembling fragmented and overlapping property rights. Due to their conflicting
views on the importance of transaction and strategic costs, it is appropriate to use
anticommons theory to challenge the assumption, held by development-oriented
theorists, that parties will be able to license patents efficiently.

*
5. THE NANOTECHNOLOGY ANTICOMMONS IN THE US

5.1. The Nanotechnology Patent “Gold Rush”
M ajor patent offices worldwide are granting nanotech patents at an

extraordinary pace.166  Lux Research, a company that provides market intelligence
and strategic advice on the physical sciences, has described the race for
nanotechnology patents as a “gold rush” involving the world’s largest
transnationals, leading university labs, and nanotech start-ups, where “patents
are the precious resource being hoarded.”167 This gold rush has primarily been
directed at nanomaterials, nanotechnology’s building blocks.168 Many companies
have obtained patents that fence off large areas of basic research in nanomaterials.
They have done so in order to secure a controlling position in nanotechnology.

165. Burk and Lemley, “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” supra note 13 at p. 1600.
166. Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7 at p. 1; Lemley, “Patenting Nanotechnology,”
supra note 10 at p. 601. David S Almeling notes that between 1997 and 2002, the number of
nanotechnology patents increased 600%, from 370 to 2,650. David S Almeling, “Patenting Nanotechnology:
Problems with the Utility Requirement,” (December 2004) 2004 Stanford Technology Law Review N1,
<http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/04_STLR_N1/fsarticle.htm> at para. 2, citing Henry M Heines,
“Patent Trends in Nanotechnology,” (September 2003) 99:9 Chemical Engineering Progress 22.
167. Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7 at p. 1.
168. Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7 at p. 1.
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5.2. The Nanotechnology Gold Rush has Resulted in the Creation of an
Anticommons in Nanomaterials in the US169

Studies suggest that the nanotechnology gold rush has resulted in the creation
of an anticommons in nanomaterials in the US.170 An anticommons is defined as a
situation in which multiple exclusionary rights exist in a scarce resource. Due to the
presence of multiple exclusionary rights, no one has an effective privilege of use in
the scarce resource. The nanomaterials patent landscape is characterized by the
presence of multiple exclusionary rights. The patent landscape in nanomaterials
is “complex and fragmented.”171 The nanotechnology “gold rush” has resulted in
the issuance of “broad and over-lapping claims” and the creation of a “somewhat
chaotic” nanotechnology patent landscape, especially for nanomaterials.172 One
cannot use a nanomaterial without first securing licenses to all of the fragmented
and overlapping patent claims on that nanomaterial.173
In nanotechnology, anticommons likely exist horizontally, vertically, and
through patent thickets. Horizontal anticommons have been created in two
main ways. First, persons wishing to use a nanomaterial must assemble all of the
fragmented and overlapping rights with respect to that nanomaterial. Second,
persons wishing to use a variety of nanomaterials to construct a nanostructure
must attempt to secure licenses for all of the nanomaterials involved. Vertical
anticommons are likely to exist due to the fact that the nanotechnology
anticommons occurs at the building block level. As a result, patent holders will
likely attempt to stack licenses on future downstream discoveries. Lastly, patent
thickets have developed in nanomaterials. Many of the patents that have been
issued for nanomaterials are broad and overlapping. The ETC Group notes that
patent thickets at the level of “fundamental nano-scale materials […] are already
creating thorny barriers for would-be innovators.”174  
169. The following analysis is based primarily on the results of a Lux Research report, supplemented by other
sources where appropriate (Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7). The Lux report was
based on a comprehensive review of 1,084 US patents (representing 19,485 claims) that relate to five
nanomaterials (dendrimers, quantum dots, carbon nanotubes, fullerenes, and nanowires). Ruben Serrato
describes the methodology used in this report to compile and categorize patents as “superb,” and states
that “the authors do an outstanding job of collecting accurate data and identifying general trends in
nanotech patents.” Serrato, describing the methodology of the report, states that “the authors carefully
searched patents with synonyms for the platform name as well as key inventors for each patent by
individual and company. Additionally, the team carefully reviewed the claims of each patent to ensure its
relevance. The patents were then classified by type: (1) building block; (2) product; (3) process of
manufacture; and (4) method of use—and by application category: (1) general; (2) structural materials; (3)
energy; (4) optics; (5) electronics; (6) healthcare and cosmetics; and (7) other. After categorizing a patent’s
individual claims, they assigned the patent itself to the category containing the greatest number of its
constituent claims. After classifying the claims, they ran statistics to score patents for each nanomaterial
platform in each application category on two axes: “white space,” comprising four metrics, and “freedom
from entanglement,” comprising seven metrics.” Serrato notes that “[t]his report can serve as an effective
tool for those involved in analyzing the patent landscape and identifying the key patents and patent
holders. CEOs, technical staff, lawyers and investors now have a quick and effective way to review patent
landscapes.” Ruben Serrato, Kirk Hermann and Chris Douglas, “The Nanotech Intellectual Property (“IP”)
Landscape,” (2005) 2:2 Nanotechnology Law & Business 2–6, <http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_
s31Publications/FileUpload137/2721/viewcontent.pdf> at p. 2. 
170. Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7; Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology,
supra note 9. 
171. Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7 at p. 1; Lemley notes that “risks of a patent
thicket may be exacerbated by the application of pre-nanotechnology patents to nanotech inventions.”
Lemley, “Patenting Nanotechnology,”supra note 10 at pp. 620–621.
172. Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 65.
173. Lux Research, “Nanotechnology Gold Rush,” supra note 7 at p. 1.
174. ETC Group, “Nanotech’s ‘Second Nature’ Patents” (ETC Group, June 2005), <http://www.etcgroup.org/
upload/publication/pdf_file/54  at p. 5. 

98

university of ottawa law & technology journal

www.uoltj.ca

5.3. Consequences of the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Nanotechnology

If potential users cannot assemble the fragmented and overlapping nanomaterials
patents into usable bundles, the nanotechnology industry could experience
significant slowdowns.175 These could occur in four ways. First, faced with
licensing roadblocks, companies could choose to engage in protracted litigation
in order to overcome the nanotechnology anticommons.176 The nanotechnology
industry could stagnate as funds are diverted towards court battles instead of
research and development. Second, the number of overlapping and fragmented
patents on nanotechnology’s building blocks could act as a deterrent to new
investment. This deterrent could “severely [limit…] the potential commercial
impact of nanotechnology.”177 In the context of nanomedicine, one commentator
notes that:
if such a dismal patent climate persists, investors are unlikely to invest in risky
nanomedicine commercialization efforts. For them, competing in this highstakes patent game may prove to be too costly.178

Such companies may choose to invest their resources elsewhere, avoiding the
nanotechnology anticommons altogether. Third, anticipating industry slowdowns,
companies could choose to disengage from the nanotechnology industry,
withdrawing their capital and investing in other areas. Fourth, public funding in
nanotechnology could decrease as a result of the tragedy of the anticommons in
nanotechnology, as the US government may not wish to fund a stagnating industry.
  

*
6. USING INFORMAL MARKET MECHANISMS TO OVERCOME THE
ANTICOMMONS

T he mere presence of an anticommons will not necessarily prevent the

efficient development and commercialization of nanomaterials.179 If parties
license their technology widely, the fragmented, overlapping patent landscape
“will not stifle development of products based on nanotechnology.”180 Assuming
that there are no transaction costs or holdouts, “owners may keep property in
anticommons form and perfectly coordinate its use so its performance mimics

175. The ETC Group warns that intellectual property roadblocks could “severely retard development of
nanotechnology.” Miller et al, supra note 9 at p. 65. In 2002, the US-based industry trade group,
Nanotechnology Business Alliance, warned in testimony before the US Congress that “several early
nanotech patents are given such broad coverage, the industry is potentially in real danger of experiencing
unnecessary legal slowdowns.” ETC, “Second Nature,” supra note 174 at p. 6. Vaidhyanathan also discusses
the potential for the nanotechnology anticommons to have a “severe chilling effect on innovation.”
Vaidhyanathan, “Nanotechnology and the Law of Patents,” supra note 154 at p. 20.
176. Products are not yet at the stage of commercial application, so the battles are not yet being fought. 
However, once products do reach the stage of commercial application, according to Matthew Nordan, vicepresident of research at Lux Research, “[t]he fights are going to be brutal.” ETC, “Second Nature,” supra
note 174 at p. 10.
177. Matsuura, Nanotechnology Regulation and Policy Worldwide, supra note 49 at p. 71.
178. Bawa, “Will the Nanomedicine ‘Patent Land Grab’ Thwart Commercialization?” supra note 155 at p. 349.
179. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 673.
180. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 673.
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that of private property.”181 There are a variety of informal mechanisms through
which individuals can attempt to coordinate the use of anticommons property,
including cross-licensing agreements, patent pools, acquisitions and exits, and
informal norms.182 These informal mechanisms have been successful in resolving
anticommons situations in other industries (for instance, the semiconductor,
automobile, aircraft manufacturing, and synthetic rubber industries).183
There are reasons to fear, however, that an anticommons will prove
more difficult to overcome in the nanotechnology industry. In nanotechnology,
transaction and strategic costs will prove to be a substantial impediment to the
achievement of informal agreements between parties. Due to transaction and
strategic costs, alternative arrangements such as cross-licensing and patent pools
are unlikely to emerge.184
Transaction costs, specifically the costs associated with determining with
whom one must negotiate in order to acquire the rights to a resource, will be a
significant expense for any party seeking to bundle patents in the nanotechnology
anticommons. These costs will be particularly high due to the fact that in an
anticommons situation, the patent rights to a resource may be overlapping or
fragmented between multiple parties. In a situation where patent rights overlap
between two parties, persons seeking licenses could choose to negotiate licenses
with both parties, knowing that one license will later prove to be unnecessary after
patent litigation addresses the overlap. Alternatively, persons seeking licenses
could attempt to discern which patent will later be invalidated, negotiating only
with the party that they believe will be ultimately successful. The former route
is unnecessarily costly. The latter route is risky. If the person wishing to license
evaluates the patents incorrectly, they could face a patent infringement lawsuit.
The question of with whom one must negotiate is further complicated
in the case of nanotechnology by the fact that many patents on nanomaterials
encompass basic research. The scope of these patents may be unclear, making
it difficult to determine exactly which party possesses rights to the resource.
Furthermore, as nanotechnology is an emerging field, terminology used
to describe various aspects of the underlying science may be ambiguous,
conflicting, or varied. Difficulties with terminology may make it more problematic
to determine exactly with whom one must negotiate, as keyword searches of a
patent database may not reveal all of the patents covering a given resource.
In addition to transaction costs, three types of bargaining failures are likely
to impede the achievement of informal licensing agreements for nanotechnology
patents. First, the nanotechnology industry is not structured in such a way as
to facilitate informal licensing agreements. Miller states that informal licensing
arrangements are:
most likely to arise when horizontal competitors who share similar values and
are engaged in repeat-play transactions each hold roughly similar portfolios
of blocking patents.185
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 673.
Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket,” supra note 155. 
Heller and Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation?” supra note 20 at p. 700. 
Miller et al, The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 71.
Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 76. 
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This describes the semiconductor industry, where informal agreements
have been successful. It does not, however, describe the nanotechnology industry,
which is characterized by parties with different sizes and agendas, operating
across a variety of industries.186 Parties possessing nanotechnology patents may
not be competitors, could be engaged in one-off transactions, and hold different
intellectual property portfolios. It is likely that complications arising from the
structure of the nanotechnology industry will “doom private efforts to establish
pooling arrangements” in nanotechnology.187
Second, the fact that many nanotechnology patents encompass basic
scientific research increases the likelihood of bargaining failure. First, companies
may wish to preserve the strategic position of their pioneering patent. Second,
difficulties in patenting around nanomaterials patents may cause patentees to
hold out for greater licensing fees. Third, valuation difficulties with respect to basic
research patents may make it more difficult for companies to achieve informal
licensing agreements. All three difficulties are accentuated by nanotechnology’s
cross-industry structure.
Third, the shift in scientific norms, from “communalism” to
“commercialism,” that occurred following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act
suggests that patent holders will be more likely to grant exclusive licenses
rather than broad, non-exclusive licenses. Lemley notes that “the royalty rates
for exclusive licenses are significantly higher than the rates for non-exclusive
licenses.”188 Exclusive licenses are generally incompatible with informal licensing
arrangements such as cross-licensing agreements between multiple parties
or patent pools. The ETC group notes that between 2003 and 2005, twenty
nanotechnology licenses were publicly announced by universities.189 Of these
licenses, “at least nineteen and perhaps all twenty were exclusive.”190
Development-oriented theorists argued that patenting basic scientific
research will lead to its efficient development and commercialization. An analysis
of the nanotechnology patent landscape has suggested that patenting basic
scientific research in nanotechnology has led to a nanotechnology anticommons.
Though the mere presence of this anticommons does not preclude the
efficient development and commercialization of nanotechnology research,
an analysis of the transaction and strategic costs associated with participation
in the nanotechnology industry indicates that it is likely that rightsholders
and prospective patentees will be unable to bundle the multiple exclusionary
rights through informal agreements. As a result, unless the nanotechnology
anticommons can be overcome through non-market routes, it is likely that the
nanotechnology anticommons will turn tragic, causing slowdowns in innovation.
A significant disparity thus exists between the assumptions of the
development-oriented approach and the reality of the nanotechnology patent
landscape. The disparity between theory and reality, in the case of nanotechnology,
is caused by the failure of the development-oriented approach to account for the
186.
187.
188.
189.

Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 76.
Miller et al., The Handbook of Nanotechnology, supra note 9 at p. 81.
Lemley, “Patenting Nanotechnology,” supra note 10 at pp. 626–627.
ETC, “Second Nature,” supra note 174 at p. 14, cited in Lemley, “Patenting Nanotechnology,” supra note
10 at p. 627.
190. Lemley, “Patenting Nanotechnology,” supra note 10 at p. 627, citing ETC, “Second Nature,” supra note 174
at p. 14.
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transaction and strategic costs involved in licensing nanomaterials patents. Kitch
himself, in a more recent work, states that the “failure to consider the importance
of licensing, transfer, and other transactions by which intellectual property rights
are shared” is an “elementary and persistent” error in the economic analysis of
intellectual property.191 He states that:
the ability of the owners of intellectual property rights to transfer these rights
in whole or in part to others is an important feature of the systems. The rights
can easily arise in the hands of persons or firms who are not in the best
position to exploit them. In order to involve others in the full exploitation of
the economic potential of the right, the owners must be able to enter into a
wide range of arrangements with other firms.192

In nanotechnology, the full exploitation of the economic potential of nanomaterials
is limited by the inability (and, in certain situations, unwillingness) of owners to
enter into arrangements with other firms. In this article, I am not taking the position
that the development-oriented approach should be abandoned. Where licensing
costs are not an issue, early patenting may lead to the efficient development and
commercialization of research. In the case of nanotechnology, however, unless
non-market routes are successful at bundling the anticommons, broad patenting
of basic research in nanotechnology is likely to hinder the development and
commercialization of nanomaterials.
  

*
7. USING NON-MARKET SOLUTIONS TO OVERCOME THE ANTICOMMONS

T he second main way to overcome the anticommons is through legislative

or judicial intervention to redefine, remove, or reallocate property rights.193
These forms of intervention will be grouped under the heading “non-market
solutions.” There are a variety of non-market solutions that can be adopted to
overcome the tragedy of the anticommons in nanotechnology in the US. These
solutions include Barzel’s grant/auction approach, compulsory licensing,
compelling licensing under the Bayh-Dole Act, the formation of a governmentsponsored patent pool, the creation of a broad experimental use exception, and
a modification of the utility requirement. In this Part, I will focus on one nonmarket solution to the problems posed by the tragedy of the anticommons in
nanotechnology in the US, namely the adoption of a strict utility requirement.  
7.1. Adoption of a Strict Utility Requirement

This section will proceed in three parts. First, it will describe the utility requirement
as it has been interpreted in US law. In the context of scientific research, the
utility requirement has fluctuated between a weak and a strict utility requirement.
191. Edmund W Kitch, “Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property,”
(2000) 53:6 Vanderbilt Law Review 1727–1741 at p. 1739.
192. Kitch, “Elementary and Persistent Errors,” supra note 191 at p. 1740.
193. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” supra note 20 at p. 641.
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Second, this section will argue that the adoption of a strict utility requirement
is particularly suited as a solution to the problems posed by the tragedy of the
anticommons in nanotechnology. I will also demonstrate the effect that a strict
utility requirement would have on the nanotechnology anticommons in the US.
Third, this section will argue that US courts are likely to adopt a strict utility
requirement for nanotechnology inventions over a weak utility requirement.
7.1.1. The Utility Requirement in US Law

The utility requirement is one of the essential requirements of patentability. It
stipulates that an individual may patent only “useful” inventions. In the US, the
utility requirement is grounded in the constitutional limitation of patent protection
to the “useful arts.”194 The utility requirement has had a central place in US patent
legislation since the first patent law in 1790.195 It is currently dealt with in Chapter
10, Title 35 of the US Code, section 101, where it is stated that:
whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.196

In the US, utility is generally not an issue when dealing with the
patentability of mechanical inventions.197 However, utility has reemerged as a
controversial issue in US patent law in fields involving scientific research.198 In
the context of scientific research, the utility requirement in the US has fluctuated
between two standards, a weak utility requirement and a strict utility requirement.
Each standard is supported by a line of precedents and by a theory of intellectual
property law. The first standard represents a weak utility requirement.
7.1.1.1. Weak Utility Requirement

Echoing the arguments of prospect theory and the development-oriented
approach, individuals advocating for a weak utility requirement argue that patents
should be granted early in the research process in order to provide an “incentive
for private firms to undertake the further investment necessary to translate the
inventions into marketable products.”199 Thus, although the invention may not
demonstrate any practical utility, patents should be granted in order to ensure that
persons will continue to develop the research prospect. To advocates of a weak
utility requirement, granting patents in basic research is the most efficient way to
develop and commercialize research. Consistent with prospect theory, licensing
concerns do not appear to be an issue to advocates of the weak utility requirement.
194. Brenner v Manson, (USA SC, 1966), <http://supreme.vlex.com/vid/brenner-v-manson-19992706>, 383 United
States Reports 519 [Brenner cited to United States Reports].
195. Brenner, supra note 194 at p. 529.
196. Patent Act (USA), “Inventions Patentable,” (1996) 35 United States Code sec. 101 (emphasis added),
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxl_35_U_S_C_101.htm#usc35s101>. 
197. Georgios I Zekos, “Utility and Biotechnology Patenting,” (2006) 5 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues,
<http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2006/issue5/zekos5.html>.
198. Zekos, “Utility and Biotechnology Patenting,” supra note 197.
199. Rai, “Regulating Scientific Research,” supra note 12 at p. 96.
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The historical origin of the weak utility requirement is found in Justice
Story’s judgment in Lowell v Lewis, an 1817 decision of the District Circuit Court
of Massachusetts.200 In this decision, Justice Story adopts a de minimis view of the
utility requirement, stating that a useful invention is one “which may be applied
to a beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention injurious to the
morals, health, or good order of society, or frivolous and insignificant.”201 In the
broadest sense of this definition, “little or nothing is wholly beyond the pale of
‘utility.’”202 In Lowell, Justice Story was not contemplating the utility requirement as
it applies to scientific research. Rather, Lowell dealt with a purported improvement
of a pump invention. Even though Justice Story was not contemplating scientific
research when he set out his view of the utility requirement, however, advocates
of early patentability of scientific research have continued to cite Justice Story’s
de minimis view of the utility requirement as support for their position.203 They
have done so on the basis that it provides an established judicial precedent for
development-oriented theory’s contention that patents should be granted at an
early phase in the research process.
7.1.1.2. Strict Utility Requirement

The second standard represents a strict utility requirement. Advocates of a strict
utility requirement take a less optimistic view of the ability of patents to support
innovation. While recognizing the need to provide incentives for research, they
state that in certain circumstances, granting patents for basic research will stifle
rather than support innovation. Patents can stifle innovation in two main ways.
First, a broad patent encompassing basic research may allow a company to block
off an entire area of scientific development. Second, granting patents for basic
research may result in the creation of an anticommons. If individuals are unable
to bundle the multiple exclusionary rights in the anticommons, innovation may
be stifled. As a result, in order to guard against those situations where patent
protection stifles rather than supports innovation, advocates of a strict utility
requirement argue for more limited patent protection.
Brenner v Manson is the representative case for the strict utility
model.204  It “represents the high-water mark” of the strict utility requirement.205
It is also the leading United States Supreme Court decision on utility. Brenner
addresses the applicants’ patent application for an “allegedly novel process
for making certain known steroids.”206 Three years after the applicants’ patent
application, the respondent Manson filed an application to patent the same
process, asserting that he had discovered the process and claiming an earlier
filing date than that of the applicants.207 A Patent Office examiner denied
Manson’s application on the grounds that it failed to disclose any utility for
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Lowell v Lewis (USA Cir Ct Mass, 1817), 15 Federal Cases 1018.  
Lowell, supra note 200, cited in Brenner supra note 194 at p. 533.  
Brenner, supra note 194 at p. 530.
Lowell is cited in decisions addressing the utility of scientific research up to and including the most recent
decision by CAFC on the utility requirement: In re Fisher (USA Fed Cir, 2005), <http://www.cafc.uscourts.
gov/opinions/04-1465.pdf>, 421 Federal Reporter 3d ser. 1365.
Brenner, supra note 194 at p. 520.
Robert P Merges, Peter S Menell and Mark A Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age,
3d ed. (Aspen, 2003) at p. 141; Almeling, “Patenting Nanotechnology,” supra note 166 at para. 20.
Brenner, supra note 194 at p. 519. 
Brenner, supra note 194 at pp. 520–521. 
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the chemical compound produced by the process.208 This denial was affirmed
by the Board of Appeals within the Patent Office, but was later reversed by
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) on the basis that the utility
requirement applied by the examiner was too strict. Instead, the CCPA applied
Justice Story’s de minimis view of the utility requirement.
The CCPA’s decision was reversed by the US Supreme Court, which
rejected Justice Story’s view of the utility requirement.209 According to Justice
Fortas (who delivered the opinion of the Court), Justice Story’s view “sheds
little light on our subject.”210 A narrow reading of Justice Story’s view forces
the adjudicator into determining whether the invention is “frivolous and
insignificant.”211 Justice Fortas states that this term gives no more guidance
than the term “useful” itself.212  Justice Fortas also notes that a broad reading
of Justice Story’s view would allow the patenting “of any invention not positively
harmful to society.”213 This interpretation of “useful” would strip the standard
of any meaning, as virtually all inventions would satisfy this utility requirement.
Justice Fortas states, correctly, that such an interpretation cannot be accepted in
the “absence of evidence that Congress so intended.”214
Justice Fortas further states that one of the purposes of the patent
system is to “encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and
inventions,” and recognizes that a strict utility requirement would “to some extent
[discourage] disclosure and [lead] to greater secrecy than would otherwise be the
case.”215  Demonstrating a certain cynicism towards patentees, however, Justice
Fortas takes the position that the benefits flowing from early patenting with respect
to the increased dissemination of information are more exaggerated than real.216
He notes that patentees frequently attempt to disclose as little useful information
as possible while broadening the scope of their claim as widely as possible.217  In
a similar manner, the Court takes a skeptical view of the importance of patents in
reducing secrecy, stating that if a process inventor cannot discern a product, he has
“every incentive to make his invention known to those able to do so.”218
Having minimized the potential positive effects of early patenting,
Justice Fortas takes the position that a “more compelling consideration” is the
negative impact of early patenting on scientific development.219 According to
the Court, granting patents before a process or product has been developed to
a degree of specific and substantial utility “creates a monopoly of knowledge”
which “may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.”220 The
Court states that “[s]uch a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of
scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public,” and should
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be granted “only if clearly commanded by the statute.”221
While affirming the value of contributions short of something “useful” to
“the fund of scientific information,” Justice Fortas rejects the idea that a patent
should be used to reward such a contribution.222 In an oft-quoted passage, Justice
Fortas states that:
a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion. [A] patent system must be related
to the world of commerce rather than the realm of philosophy.223

The phrase “world of commerce” seems to imply that patents should
not be granted until the invention reaches the point of commercial applicability.
Both the reference to a patent as compensation for a “successful conclusion” and
the rejection of the concept of a patent as a “reward for the search” imply that
patents should not be granted until the end of the research process.
Both In re Joly and In re Kirk, decided the year after Brenner, affirmed
Brenner in adopting a strict utility requirement.224 Dissenting judges in both cases,
however, continued to advocate for a weak utility requirement based on concerns
that denying patent protection will harm future research and innovation. After
Kirk and Joly, the CCPA permitted the weak utility requirement to reemerge
as the dominant view of the utility requirement in US patent law.225 It did so
in part as a response to the concerns of researchers that patent protection is
necessary in order to progress efficiently from research to products ready for
commercialization.226
The high-water mark of the weak utility requirement in the modern era
occurred in 1995, with the decision of the CAFC in In re Brana and the passage
of the 1995 USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines.227 In Brana, the CAFC noted that
“usefulness in patent law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical
inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of further research and
development.”228 In 1995, a set of USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines was
released.229 These guidelines are to be used by USPTO personnel in their review of
patent applications for compliance with the “utility requirement.”230 These guidelines
echoed Brana in adopting a weak standard of utility. According to the guidelines:
if the applicant has asserted that the claimed invention is useful for any
particular purpose (i.e., a “specific utility”) and that assertion would be
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considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art, [an officer should
not…] impose a rejection based on lack of utility.231

Following the decision in Brana and the issuance of the 1995 PTO
guidelines, concerns began to grow regarding the negative effects of early
patenting. One expression of these concerns is found in Heller and Eisenberg’s
work on anticommons theory, published in 1998.232 The USPTO responded to
concerns regarding the negative effects of patenting basic research on 5 January
2001, with the release of a new set of Utility Examination Guidelines.233 These
guidelines call for a more stringent utility requirement to be applied in patent
decisions.234 Incorporated into the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, the
2001 guidelines state that in order for the utility requirement to be satisfied,
there must be a “specific, substantial, [and] credible utility.”235 Specific utility
is “particular to the subject matter claimed and would not be applicable to a
broad class of invention.”236 The Utility Guidelines “explain that a substantial
utility defines a ‘real world’ use.”237 The guidelines quote various statements from
Brenner, including the statement that “a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a
reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.”238
In re Fisher, a 2005 CAFC decision, is the most recent decision of the
CAFC to address the utility requirement.239 Fisher reaffirms the strict utility
requirement as established in Brenner, adopts the 2001 utility examination
guidelines, and articulates definitions for “specific” and “substantial” utility.
The claimed invention in Fisher relates to “five purified nucleic acid sequences
that encode proteins and protein fragments in maize plants.”240 These claimed
sequences are commonly referred to as “expressed sequence tags” or “ESTs.”241
ESTs have been described as representing:
one discrete portion of a larger gene, and are most often marketed by
biotechnology companies as tools for investigating parts of the genome that
are active in producing proteins. Patents are often sought for ESTs before any
function is known beyond their significance for further research.242

The examiner, finding that the claims were not supported by a specific
and substantial utility, rejected them for lack of utility.243 The Board affirmed
the examiner’s rejection of the application for lack of utility.244 Asserting that
231. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines 1995, supra note 227 at s. IIB 2a.
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the Board applied a heightened standard for utility in the case of ESTs, Fisher
appealed to the CAFC, contending that section 101 demands a standard no
higher than Justice Story’s view of utility.245
In Fisher, the government was supported by various academic institutions
and biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, writing as amici curiae.246
These groups “assert that Fisher’s claimed uses are nothing more than a ‘laundry
list’ of research plans.”247 They are general, speculative, and do not provide a
“specific and substantial benefit in currently available form.”248
As did the US Supreme Court in Brenner, the CAFC in Fisher rejects
Justice Story’s de minimis view of utility, adopting a strict utility requirement.249
Chief Judge Michel, writing for the court, notes that “following Brenner, our
predecessor court [the CCPA], and this court have required a claimed invention
to have a specific and substantial utility to satisfy section 101.”250 This utility is
also referred to as practical utility, which is synonymous with attributing “‘realworld’ value to claimed subject manner.”251 In other words, the discovery must
provide some “immediate benefit to the public.”252
Chief Justice Michel notes that a specific utility is specific to the subject
matter claimed and can “provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the
public.”253 This contrasts with a general utility that is applicable to a broad class
of invention. Chief Judge Michel also notes that for an invention to have specific
utility, its use must not be “so vague as to be meaningless.”254
Chief Judge Michel then proceeds to define “substantial utility.”
According to Chief Judge Michel, substantial utility “defines a ‘real world’ use.”255
Utilities that “require or constitute carrying out further research to identify or
reasonably confirm a ‘real world’ context of use are not substantial utilities.”256
As noted in Fisher:
[A]n application must show that an invention is useful to the public as
disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date
after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the “substantial” utility
requirement, an asserted use must show that the claimed invention has a
significant and presently available benefit to the public.257

Chief Judge Michel specifically notes the concerns by government and
its amici that “allowing EST patents without proof of utility would discourage
research, delay scientific discovery, and thwart progress in the ‘useful Arts’ and
‘Science.’”258 Furthermore, it could give rise to multiple patents relating to the
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same gene and create an unnecessarily convoluted licensing environment.259
Rather than explicitly making his decision on these policy grounds, however, Chief
Judge Michel notes that these considerations are more appropriately directed to
Congress.260 Instead, Chief Judge Michel bases his decision on past precedent.
By citing passages from Brenner which focus on the dangers of locking up vast
unknowable areas of research, however, Chief Judge Michel implicitly addresses
the policy concerns of anticommons theorists.
7.1.2. The Adoption of a Strict Utility Requirement is Particularly Suited as a
Solution to the Tragedy of the Anticommons

The nanotechnology anticommons emerged as a consequence of the broad
patenting of nanomaterials. A solution to the tragedy of the anticommons in
nanotechnology, therefore, can be achieved by removing property rights from
nanomaterials. The utility requirement is particularly suited to effect this change.
Many of the patents making up the nanotechnology anticommons encompass
basic research. These patents were granted on the basis of a weak utility
requirement. They would not have been granted under a strict utility requirement.
The adoption of a strict utility requirement for nanotechnology inventions will shift
patents away from basic scientific research in nanomaterials towards the practical
application of nanomaterials.261 As a result, many of the broad, overlapping
patents in the nanotechnology anticommons will be invalidated.
The adoption of a strict utility requirement is not a complete solution
to the problems posed by the tragedy of the anticommons in nanotechnology.
Many patents on nanomaterials would, in all probability, satisfy the elevated
utility requirement while still having sufficient breadth to be considered part
of the nanotechnology anticommons. Nevertheless, the elimination of multiple
exclusionary rights from the nanotechnology anticommons makes it more likely
that users will be able to bundle the remaining nanomaterial patent fragments
through informal licensing agreements. Consequently, the adoption of a strict
utility requirement makes it less likely that the nanotechnology anticommons will
turn tragic. This part will proceed by evaluating the effects of the weak and strict
utility requirements on the nanotechnology anticommons.
7.1.2.1. Effects of the Various Utility Requirements on the Nanotechnology
Anticommons
7.1.2.1.1. Weak Utility Requirement

The adoption of a weak utility requirement would perpetuate the existing
nanotechnology anticommons by permitting further patenting of basic scientific
research in nanotechnology.
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7.1.2.1.2. Strict Utility Requirement

The adoption of a strict utility requirement would play a positive role in ensuring
that the nanotechnology anticommons does not turn tragic. As noted above,
as held in Brenner and affirmed in both the 2001 USPTO Utility Examination
Guidelines and Fisher, inventions will be considered to be useful in the US under
a strict utility requirement if they provide a “specific, substantial and credible
utility.”262 The adoption of a strict utility requirement for nanotechnology
inventions would invalidate those patents that do not disclose a specific,
substantial, and credible utility. This would have the effect of removing various
rights of exclusion from the anticommons. In addition to weakening the
anticommons, the adoption of a strict utility requirement would also have the
effect of reducing transaction and strategic costs, making it more likely that
users would be able to bundle the remaining rights in the anticommons.
The adoption of a strict utility standard would invalidate a substantial
number of nanomaterial patents. For example, US patent 5,424,054 is one patent
that would, in all likelihood, be invalidated under a strict utility requirement. It
claims “a hollow carbon fiber wall consisting essentially of a single layer of carbon
atoms” (a carbon nanotube). In terms of utility, the patent application states that:
These single atomic layer fibers could be used to assemble structures with low
density and high surface to volume ratios, wires with extremely small
diameters and solids with highly anisotropic properties. They also could be
semiconducting or metallic depending on their helicity. These single atomic
layer fibers could be used directly in assemblies or structures, or could serve
as uniform “seed” substrates for growth of larger ordered structures.263

The application above demonstrates neither specific nor substantial utility, and
would likely fail to meet the “strict” utility standard.
As noted in Fisher, in order to satisfy the “specific” utility requirement,
“an application must disclose a use which is not so vague as to be meaningless.”264
The asserted use must demonstrate that the “claimed invention can be used
to provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public.”265 According to
the 2001 USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, a specific utility is particular
to the subject matter claimed and would not be applicable to a broad class of
invention.266
A court could interpret the application above as being “so vague as to
be meaningless.” The application refers to “structures with low density and high
surface to volume ratios” without describing these structures in detail. In the
same way, it refers to “wires with extremely small diameters,” “solids with highly
anisotropic properties,” assemblies and structures. These vague references to
larger order structures provide little to no specificity. Furthermore, the application
is not “particular to the subject matter claimed.” Rather, it is applicable to a
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broad class of invention. It could be said that the description could apply to any
carbon fiber, not simply one with a single layer of carbon atoms. This invention
thus provides neither a well-defined nor particular benefit.
In a similar manner, the application could fail to satisfy the “substantial”
utility requirement. As noted in Fisher, the substantial utility requirement
demands “practical utility” and “real world” utility.267 The invention must provide
some “immediate benefit” or a “presently available benefit” to the public.268 As
noted by the USPTO and in Fisher, the application must show that an “invention
is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful
at some future date after further research.”269
If the words “immediate benefit” and “presently available” are
interpreted strictly, the fact that the application only discloses potential utilities
would mean that it will likely fail the substantial utility requirement. In the case
of the patent noted above, further research is required to confirm real world
contexts of use. The application also seems to fall under one of the USPTO’s
enumerated situations in which no substantial utility is found, namely, a claim to
an intermediate product for use in making a final product that has no specific,
substantial and credible utility.270 The structures and wires discussed in the
application are not identified. As a result, they are not “specific.” Therefore, under
the USPTO’s 2001 guidelines, the patent would likely fail the utility requirement.
The adoption of a strict utility requirement is not a complete solution,
however, to the problems posed by the tragedy of the anticommons in
nanotechnology. Many patents on nanomaterials would, in all probability,
satisfy the elevated utility requirement while still having sufficient breadth to be
considered part of the nanotechnology anticommons. However, the adoption
of a strict utility requirement would substantially weaken the nanotechnology
anticommons. In addition to weakening the anticommons, a strict utility
requirement will also reduce transaction and strategic costs with respect to
patents on nanomaterials, making it more likely that patentees and licensees will
be able to reach informal agreements to bundle the remaining exclusionary rights
through informal market mechanisms.
The application of a strict utility requirement for nanotechnology
inventions will reduce transaction costs in three main ways. First, costly negotiations
will not have to be conducted with those patent holders whose patents have
become invalidated as a result of the strengthened utility requirement. Second,
the elevated utility requirement may also make it easier for a potential licensee
to determine exactly which patents she needs to pursue in seeking to license
a nanomaterial. It is likely that many patents that do not satisfy the strict utility
requirement will have been granted earlier in nanotechnology’s development.
As terminology was less settled in the early phases of nanotechnology research,
these patents may have been described, in patent applications, in ways that
would cause them to go undetected in routine patent searches. Third, it may be
easier to negotiate informal licensing agreements once a significant number of
nanomaterial patents are purged through the adoption of a strict utility standard.
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Strategic costs can be reduced in two main ways. First, the application of
a strict utility requirement should reduce valuation difficulties in nanotechnology
patents. Those patents that fail the strict utility test are likely to be vague and
broad. It is more difficult to quantify the value of these patents than those
that demonstrate a specific and substantial utility. Patents that demonstrate a
substantial and specific utility are closer to commercial application than patents
for basic research. As a result, it is likely easier to make a determination as to
their value. Second, the application of a strict utility requirement will eliminate
many patents held by individuals as “tollbooths” on the road to development. To
serve effectively as a tollbooth, patents must be broad, vague, and general so as
to cast as wide a net as possible. These patents will likely be invalidated through
the application of a strict utility requirement. Having reduced the incentive to
hold pioneering patents, patentees may be more inclined to enter into informal
licensing agreements.
7.1.3. US Courts are Likely to Adopt a Strict Utility Requirement when Faced
with a Nanotechnology Patent Application

The issue of the strength of the utility requirement in nanotechnology inventions
has not yet been examined by a US court. This issue is likely to arise in the
near future, as products made using nanomaterials become profitable enough
to trigger expensive patent litigation. When faced with a utility issue in a
nanotechnology patent application, courts will in all likelihood adopt a strict utility
requirement over a weak utility requirement. First, as compared to 1995, when
Brana was decided and the 1995 USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines were
released, precedent now points in the direction of a strict utility requirement.
The controlling US Supreme Court case, the most recent CAFC case, and the
most recent USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines all adopt a strict utility
requirement.271 As well, Fisher demonstrates that the CAFC, a court which has
traditionally expanded rather than contracted patent rights, is ready to follow the
US Supreme Court and apply a heightened utility requirement. Fisher reverses
the trend of permitting patenting at an earlier phase in the research process.
Second, since the late 1990s, skepticism has been growing regarding
the ability of basic research patents to lead to the efficient development and
commercialization of research. This skepticism is demonstrated in anticommons
theory, in the passage of the 2001 USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, and the
CAFC’s decision in Fisher. Though the CAFC explicitly disavowed contemporary
policy concerns in Fisher, it implicitly recognized them and reacted to them
through references from Brenner. In Brenner, Justice Fortas was concerned that
giving a patentee broad control over an unknowable area will lead to slowdowns
in innovation. This concern is similar to the anticommons theorists’ concern that
excessive transaction costs will render individuals unable to assemble fragmented
and overlapping patents into a single usable bundle, thus causing a broad,
unknowable area of scientific research to remain inaccessible to future innovators.
It is unlikely that the CAFC, after adopting a strict utility requirement
for ESTs, will adopt a weak utility requirement for nanotechnology inventions. A
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weak utility requirement presents an overly optimistic view of the ability of broad
patents on basic scientific research to lead to the efficient development and
commercialization of research. A strict utility requirement achieves a workable
balance between providing support and incentives for companies to invest
resources in the development of basic research while ensuring that the building
blocks of scientific research remain accessible to future innovators. The adoption
of a strict utility requirement will play a positive role in overcoming the tragedy of
the anticommons in nanotechnology.

*
8. CONCLUSION
N anotechnology has been heralded as the next transformative technology, a

USA$1 trillion industry that has the potential to prolong life and end world
hunger, among other spectacular possibilities.272 Over the last few decades,
scientists and their research partners have acquired nanotechnology patents in a
manner resembling a “gold rush.”273 The nanotechnology gold rush has
specifically targeted nanomaterials, nanotechnology’s building blocks.274 Many of
the patents that have been granted for nanomaterials are broad, general patents
encompassing basic research.
Nanotechnology is the first modern technology to have its basic research
patented.275 Basic research in most other technologies in the twentieth century
remained in the public domain.276 A driving force behind the patenting of basic
research in nanotechnology was the development-oriented approach to patent
rights. This approach emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Development-oriented
theorists argued that the most efficient way to achieve the development and
commercialization of research is to grant broad patents on research prospects
shortly after their discovery. Development-oriented arguments supported the
widespread patenting of basic research in the 1980s and 1990s.277
Beginning in 1998 with the publication of Heller’s “The Tragedy of the
Anticommons,” proponents of “anticommons theory” challenged the claims
of development-oriented theorists that the broad patenting of basic research
necessarily leads to the efficient development and commercialization of
research.278 Anticommons theorists argued that this assumption fails to take into
account the possibility that granting broad patents on research prospects could
stifle development through the phenomenon of the tragedy of the anticommons.
This article has examined the US nanotechnology patent landscape in
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order to determine whether the broad patenting of basic research in nanomaterials
has stifled development in nanotechnology through the phenomenon of
the tragedy of the anticommons. An analysis of the nanotechnology patent
landscape suggests that the nanotechnology “gold rush” has created an
anticommons in nanomaterials. Patents in nanomaterials are broad, overlapping,
and fragmented.279 Before a person can use a nanomaterial, they must first secure
licenses to all of the exclusionary rights. If they cannot, the resource will go
underused and innovation will suffer. In short, the anticommons will turn tragic.
There are two main ways to prevent the nanotechnology anticommons
from becoming tragic. The first is through informal market mechanisms. As
demonstrated above, transaction costs and strategic behaviour will likely prove to
be substantial impediments to the achievement of informal licensing agreements
in nanotechnology. The second way to prevent the anticommons from becoming
tragic is through non-market solutions. This article has canvassed various nonmarket solutions. I have proposed the adoption of a strict utility requirement
as a solution to the problems posed by the tragedy of the anticommons in
nanotechnology in the US.
The adoption of a strict utility requirement for nanotechnology inventions
will shift patents away from basic research in nanomaterials towards the practical
application of nanomaterials. As a result, a substantial number of broad, general
patents encompassing basic research in nanotechnology will be invalidated,
weakening the anticommons and reducing transaction and strategic costs. It is
likely that US courts, when confronted with the question of the proper strength
of the utility requirement in nanotechnology inventions, will adopt a strict utility
requirement in line with Brenner, the 2001 USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines,
and Fisher.280
The adoption of a strict utility requirement, however, is not a complete
solution to the problems posed by the tragedy of the anticommons in
nanotechnology. In all probability, many patents on nanomaterials will satisfy
the elevated utility requirement while still having sufficient breadth to be
considered part of the nanotechnology anticommons. Transaction and strategic
costs associated with licensing these patents may prevent users from bundling
the remaining exclusionary rights in the nanotechnology anticommons. Thus,
although the adoption of a strict utility requirement will weaken the anticommons,
innovation may still be stifled.
If licensing difficulties cause significant damage to the nascent US
nanotechnology industry after adoption of the strict utility requirement,
Congress must take its cue from the CAFC in Fisher and take further action to
address the problem of the tragedy of the anticommons in nanotechnology. In
seeking to provide a complete solution to the problems posed by the tragedy
of the anticommons in nanotechnology, Congress should create governmentsponsored patent pools for nanomaterials. The creation of governmentsponsored patent pools for nanomaterials will ensure that nanomaterials can be
used in downstream implementations. It will also reward those researchers who
originally discovered and developed basic research in nanomaterials. Difficulties
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with respect to patent valuation, patent validity, and the scope of patent pools
must be addressed before government-created patent pools can act as a solution
to the problems posed by the nanotechnology anticommons. Furthermore, given
the disruptive effects that the creation of a government-sponsored patent pool
will have on investment and capital, Congress should create patent pools for
nanomaterials only after it is satisfied that licensing difficulties are causing harm
to the nanotechnology industry.
Nanotechnology has been said to have the potential to help attain the
Millennium Development Goals, to bring everlasting life, to reverse the trends of
global warming, to eliminate disease and poverty, and to build a utopian world
one atom at a time. Whether nanotechnology will accomplish any of these goals,
or whether it is all merely science fiction, is a matter for debate. Unless action is
taken to eliminate the nanotechnology anticommons, however, transaction and
strategic costs may stifle nanotechnology’s incredible potential. This would be
truly tragic.

